BOOK REVIEWS
The Criminal Mind. By Philip Q. Roche. New York: Farrar, Straus and
Cudahy, 1958. Pp. xi, 299. $5.00.
Of 11 the problems in the administration of the criminal law, perhaps the
most difficult is the determination of responsibility for criminal acts. Many of
us who practice and teach that law are dissatisfied with existing tests of responsibility. We seek more adequate tests as well as procedures for determining
responsibility. The literature of psychiatry is not very helpful. Herbert Wechsler, Chief Reporter of the American Law Institute Model Penal Code Project,
was moved to say in a recent speech before a group of psychiatrists: "Why
should the literature of law and psychiatry be so polemical... ? One reason
I believe is that the literature is, if I may say so, often merely ritual in character.... When I say ritual I mean it literally-a kind of religious rite that consists mainly of giving law and lawyers hell."'
So we turn with eagerness to the work of a recipient of the Isaac Ray Award
given annually by the American Psychiatric Association to the person deemed
most worthy by reason of his contributions to the relations of law and psychiatry. This is especially true when the book bears the imposing title and subtitle,
The Criminal Mind-A Study of Communication between Criminal Law and
Psychiatry.
It is distressing to have to report that The Criminal Mind is merely another
addition to the familiar ritual literature referred to by Professor Wechsler-a
work devoted mainly to giving the law and lawyers hell without even a morsel
of constructive criticism. Doubtless, before this review is finished, I will have
yielded to a strong temptation to reply in kind.
In spite of the subtitle of this book, it is definitely not concerned with communication between lawyers and psychiatrists. For the most part it is written
in technical psychiatric language which makes it difficult for a lawyer to get the
gist of what Dr. Roche is trying to say. I doubt that very many lawyers not
under the impetus of a promise to write a book review will fight their way to
the end.
The problem of the lawyer-reader can best be illustrated by a quotation in
which the author tries to explain the difference between the legal and psychiatric
concepts of intent. He brushes off the former with a statement that when the
law says absence of intent renders one incapable of committing a crime, it
really means that the triers are incapable of attaching guilt. He goes on:
1Wechsler, Law, Morals and Psychiatry: Old Problems and Recent Reassessments,
Address at 37th Annual Meeting of the New York Society for Clinical Psychiatry, New York
City, Jan. 15, 1959.
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Let us turn to the mentally ill person and to a psychiatric view of the workings of
intent. In the model of dynamic psychology intent refers to all structural, instinctual
impulses which are carried with a centrifugal force to the conscious periphery with or
without verbal counterpart. In this view, the essential elements that shape behaviour
are not only the primary instinctual drive or the formed intent alone which defines the
goal of behaviour, but also the secondary elements acquired from the conditionings of
child rearing. These are referred to as the patterns of control which are interposed between the stimulus and response. In psychiatry we speak of them as the ego and super
ego; the former, the executor of behaviour, the latter, the evaluator. In health and
maturity the ego and super ego stand in the way of intent, to stay it, if it is not in
conformity with moral and realistic standards. We think of ego and super ego not as
personifications, but as neutral patterns of feedback responses built into the nervous
system and acting in large degree automatically and beyond conscious awareness.
Mental life is a continuous flow of psychic forces arising from the organic matrix of
the body, directed as adaptive responses to the outside world, and modified more or
less in conformity with the symbols of the environment [pp. 87-88].
This sort of language, which is typical of much of the book, makes me conclude that the book is not intended for lawyers, at least not for those without
fair amount of psychiatric background. This statement should be qualified since
Dr. Roche has interposed at various places fascinating case studies which are
designed to illustrate the inter-working of law and psychiatry. In spite of occasional technical psychiatric comment, these cases are worth-while reading for
the lawyer.
Dr. Roche makes an extensive attack on the trial phase of criminal justice.
Only by using samples of his language can I give an adequate impression of the
nature of this attack. He says:
Criminal justice is an institutionlized exteriorization and extension of the child
rearing operation.... Child rearing does not stop when the individual ceases to be a
child. The law takes over where the parent leaves off [p. 66]. lIlt articulates a religious
meaning--it mediates an inner conviction of divine intervention in earthly affairs, ex
ore Dei [p. 72].
[T]he criminal trial is an operation having a religious meaning essential as a public
exercise in which the prevailing moral ideas are dramatized and reaffirmed. The religious meaning is the adjusting of tensional moral conflict within the law-abiding. The
conflict is materialized in the actions of the criminal, and dissipated in the ritual of
guilt fastening, condemnation and punishment ....
[Ilt has the function of public
edification rather than that of welfare of the individual wrong-doers who pass over its
stage in an endless procession ....
[I]t is an end in itself, and... any attempt to
bring a scientific discipline into ritual has been and will be met with resistance that
flows from a sense of profanation... [pp. 245-46].
[Ilt simultaneously provides subjectively a theater for the repetition of crime and
the undoing of it in fantasy with mass participation and also provides an arena of conflict on another level on which the triers contend with each other in a highly stylized
game within a game [p. 246].
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What should be the function of the psychiatrist in such a trial? Again let us
refer to the words of Dr. Roche.
My emphasis on the emotional and ludic elements of the public-centered phase of
criminal justice is submitted in the interest of my thesis that within the present restrictions imposed by legal procedure only a psychiatry of a kind could be introduced.
It is a "legai" psychiatry founded on the static, elementalistic class theoretical concept
of human behaviour couched in terms of the M'Naghten rule of right and wrong. A
dynamic psychiatry of field-theoretical concepts purporting deterministic necessity
could not be articulated in this medium [p. 75].
He seems to be attempting to say something like this: "I emphasize the emotional and ridiculous aspects of the criminal trial for a reason. In such a trial
only an emotional and ridiculous psychiatry can be introduced. There is no
place in such a trial for a deterministic psychiatry." He goes on to conclude that
at such a trial the psychiatrist is a kind of scapegoat, "a functionary on whom
the guilt can be sympathetically displaced" (p. 107).
Dr. Roche, like many of his brethren, has no sympathy for the criminal law
notion of responsibility. In his inimitable language he says:
Responsibility is an Idol of the Theater with which the psychiatrist in court is
faced, but for which he has neither comprehension nor concern. Responsibility in the
sense that the criminal law employs it as a mystical property possessed by some and
not by others, as something that can be reckoned to a scale of none to total, divisible
and variable in time and place, is derived from the primitive organization of the mind
which magically equates injury in the talion principle. It is one of the "subjective
adherences" having no existence other than in the minds of those who talk about it
[p. 170].
To me this quotation illustrates complete unawareness of the real problem
of responsibility. Responsibility is no mythical property. It is a short-hand
term for the process of deciding whether the defendant will be subjected to
treatment in a penal institution or treatment in a mental hospital.
Dr. Roche offers no constructive criticism of the criminal trial. Rather, the
psychiatrist's role in the trial must be re-examined in order to separate the
"higher thought" of the psychiatrist from the "magic" of the criminal trial.
"Until the psychiatrist's role in the public drama of criminal justice is clearly
defined and acknowledged, he will continue to be suspect" (p. 79). The psychiatrist must therefore limit himself to testimony concerning medical facts.
These views can be examined more concretely in the light of the M'Naghten
tests.2 What can a psychiatrist do when faced with the M'Naghten formula? He
may be asked hypothetically or directly whether the defendant was suffering
from such a defect of reason that he was not able to understand the nature or
quality of his act, and whether at the time it was committed he knew that it
was wrong.
2 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
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Dr. Roche does not want to answer the M'Naghlen questions because
M'Naghten "imposes upon medical men answers to a question of insanity, a
legal matter, rather than upon a judge or jury who are charged with making
legal decisions" (p. 103). This, Dr. Roche says, the psychiatrist cannot do.
The method of determining such knowledge [right and wrong] is not taught in
medical schools. Science provides no method for equating mental illness with innocence... [p. 107]. The psychiatrist is asked to examine the accused and he does.
He collects medical data which relates to the relationship of the accused to his social
environment. He decides that the accused was or was not suffering with a mental illness, having some temporal connection with his unlawful act. Actually this is as far as
he can go.... How can he ascertain directly the defendant's knowledge responsive
to the M'Naghten questions? Not from his medical data ...[p. 1081.
Dr. Roche is not disturbed if the M'Naghten questions are put to the jury.
He says:
Psychiatrists would not complain of the M'Naghten formula if it were put exclusively
to the jury, which, with the medical facts in evidence, in all probability would do no
better or no worse with it than the expert. In sum, the psychiatrist is not opposed to
any legal test as long as it is put to the right people. He is not opposed to any test
which is a medical desideratum and within his competence. The M'Naghten test is
not a medical desideratum and it is outside his competence [p. 173].
In other words, Dr. Roche feels that the psychiatrist can do no more than
give his views as to the existence of a mental disease having some contemporary
connection with the defendant's act. If he goes on and gives moral opinions he
is testifying as a man and not as a psychiatrist. The jury should make the moral
decision. Making the psychiatrist answer the M'Naghkek questions is conferring
on him more than a clinical function or even an intuitive function. It is endowmng him "with an expertness which can be none other than a higher order of
clairvoyance" (p. 108).
This should not be too disturbing to lawyers. Merely because the answers to
the M'Naghten questions are outside the expert competence of a psychiatrist does
not mean that the jury cannot answer them. Let the psychiatrist testify as to
the mental illness of the defendant, whether it was temporal to the criminal
act, and what sort of things may be expected from one suffering from the particular form of mental illness. Let the lay witnesses testify as to the actual
appearance and activities of the defendant. Then let the jury draw the necessary inference as to whether the defendant should be treated as responsible.
By this time, doubtless, the reader wonders whether Dr. Roche would find
the Durham test, or, for that matter, any test more to his liking than the
M'Naghten test. In Durham, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
found the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests to be inadequate. It said:
"an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product
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of mental disease or mental defect. ' 3 Subsequent decisions have made it clear
that Durham is not the exclusive test. Instructions to juries in suitable cases
can still include M'Naghten and the irresistible impulse tests. 4 Furthermore, the
court has clarified somewhat the ambiguity of the word "product." It has
emphasized the requirement that the relationship between the disease and the
act must be critical, decisive, determinative, causal. The court has said:
".. . we mean to convey the idea inherent in the phrases 'because of', 'except
for', 'without which', 'but for', 'effect of', 'result of', 'causative factor' ....
They mean that the facts concerning the disease and the facts concerning the
act are such as to justify reasonably the conclusion that 'But for this disease
the act would not have been committed.' ",
Under the current version of Durham, what is the function of the psychiatrist? Judge Prettyman has said: "The problems of the law in these cases are
[1] whether a person who has committed a specific criminal act.., was suffering from a mental disease... ; [2] whether there was a relationship between
that specific disease and the specific alleged criminal act; and [3] whether that
relationship was such as to justify a reasonable inference the the accused would
not have committed the act if he had not had the disease."8 Speaking to the
respective functions of the psychiatrist and the jury, he went on: "The law
wants from the medical experts [1] medical diagnostic testimony as to a mental
illness, if any, and [2] expert medical opinion as to the relationship, if any, between the disease and the act of which the prisoner is accused. The conclusions,
7
the inferences, from the facts are for the trier of the f acts."
Dr. Roche is unwilling to go as far as Judge Prettyman would have him go;
he would limit the testimony of the psychiatrist to the giving of opinions as to
the existence of mental llness. He says the psychiatrist properly must always
answer the causation or product question in the affirmative. He has never
encountered a case where outward behaviour was unrelated to inward mental
life. If he answers the question in the negative he is doing the same thing he
does with the M'Naghten questions. Dr. Roche explains that the product test is
a subjective determination upon which is pivoted the question of moral responsibility, which the court or jury should resolve. He submits: "if the product
question is withheld from the expert and confined to the triers, psychiatry can
function properly. The jury can decide the matter under applicable law as instructed by the court, .since it is determining a moral (legal) issue on its own
terms. In this insulation of the psychiatrist from the 'product' question we are
3Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (App. D.C., 1954). Durham himself
finally pleaded guilty on the eve of his third trial. See United States v. Fielding, 148 F.Supp.
46, 51 n. 6 (D.D.C., 1957).
4Douglas v. United States, 239 F.2d 52, 58 (App. D.C., 1956).

5

Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (App. D.C., 1956).
6 Ibid.
7 Id., at 617-18.
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keeping our symbols straight and pure" (p. 266). He suggests that the product
question be answered by the jury in the language of arbitrary relations in the
manner that they ponder such concepts as negligence, fraud, hot blood, and
other legal concepts.
In summary, Dr. Roche says: "The withdrawal of the 'product' wing of
Durham from the expert witness will complete the work of liberating medical
testimony from the ghost of M'Naghten, and there will remain the foundations
for a rational manipulation of mentally ill persons who commit unlawful acts"
(p. 272).8
One proposal for solution of the responsibility problem which has substantial
support from lawyers is that of the Model Penal Code. The Code excludes responsibility where the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, "lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law." 9 The provision is designed to
correct the main defects of M'Naghten and the irresistible impulse test. It recognizes that the actor may know what he is doing and that it is wrong, but still
be unable to control his conduct. It rejects the implied restriction of the irresistible impulse test to sudden spontaneous conduct. Both M'Naghten and the
irresistible impulse test require complete impairment that seldom exists. The
Code provision is phrased in terms of "substantial" lack of capacity.
Dr. Roche's discussion of the Model Penal Code is sketchy, but he finds it no
more satisfactory than Durham or M'Naghten. He thinks it highly improbable
that any mentally disordered person who commits a criminal act is substantially
unappreciative of its criminality. "M'Naghten's Cheshire Cat has vanished
but the grin lingers" (p. 181).
This review is already too long, but mention should be made of the fact that
T"he Criminal Mind includes short discussions of the pre-trial and post-trial
phases of criminal justice. In these areas Dr. Roche finds himself more content
with the current role of the psychiatrist than in the trial area. In fact, he indicates briefly in closing that eventually he would like to see the role of the psychiatrist in the trial eliminated altogether, with the defense of insanity raised
in a separate administrative proceeding after the trial.
Dr. Roche does not discuss the question of whether psychiatry has reached
the stage where it is ready for such a system. In a recent case eleven courtappointed and government agency psychiatrists testified. Five thought the
mental disorder of the defendant dated back to his crime. Six either did not or
8

The reluctance of psychiatrists to answer the product question is illustrated by Wright v.
United States, 250 F.2d 4, 8 (App. D.C., 1957), where medical witnesses were asked whether
the defendant's act was the product of the illness. The replies included, "Yes," "Could very
well be," "Likely," "Surely possible," with two replying that they had insufficient data to
support an opinion. One of the latter explained that the causal connection between an individual's mental illness and his act "requires very intensive investigation and examination of
the person."
I Model Penal Code § 4.01(1) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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were unable to express an opinion. We can readily agree with the conclusion of
Judge Miller that "the fact that six of the eleven psychiatrists could not diagnose Wright's mentality as of June 20, 1951, on the basis of examinations made
long thereafter, while from similar data the other five professed to be able to do
so, demonstrates a serious conflict in the medical testimony. It doubtless caused
the jury to wonder how, and to question whether, the five could actually do
what the other six equally qualified experts said they could not do ...."
"About all the medical testimony in its entirety proved to a certainty is that
psychiatry is not an exact science."' 0 Perhaps there are advantages to leaving
final determination of questions of responsibility to the good judgment of a
judge and jury, thereby permitting Dr. Roche to keep his "symbols straight
and pure."
REx A. COLLINGS, JR.*
10
Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4, 15 (App. D.C., 1957) (dissenting opinion).
* Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.

Federal Tax Fraud Law. By Ernest R. Mortenson. Indianapolis: The BobbsMerrill Company, 1958. Pp. vi, 312. $12.00.
Tax fraud cases combine problems which lawyers encounter separately in
fraudulent financial schemes, criminal prosecutions, and tax litigation. Since the
same lawyer is rarely experienced in unthreading all three types of fabric, a
treatise which comprehensively treats the total problem is a welcome addition
to the library of all whose clients might some day receive a visit from a special
agent.
Mr. Mortenson's Federal Tax Fraud Law is of inestimable value to tax
specialists, general practitioners, and accountants alike, for it does more than
discuss the litigation aspects of tax fraud cases: it also tells the whole story of
a fraud case, from the beginning of the investigation to the trial of the case
and the subsequent assessment and collection (or compromise) of the civil
penalties. Mr. Mortenson's fruitful career in the Tax Division of the Department of Justice and the Chief Counsel's office of the Internal Revenue Service,
preceded and followed by a considerable period of private practice, makes him
a fit portrayer of the inception and development of a tax fraud case both from
the vantage point of the government people who gather and evaluate the facts
and from the viewpoint of the taxpayer's representative.
The hypothetical report of a special agent (pp. 34-43) is worthy of careful
study, because it throws considerable light on the thought processes and investigative procedures of the agents, and reveals the reasons for some of the inquiries they make. It also shows the importance of developing facts favorable
to the taxpayer as early in the investigation as possible. The practitioner who
understands the type of report which an agent writes, and knows that alleged

